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DOES THE LACK OF BINDING PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AFFECT TRANSPARENCY IN ARBITRAL 
PROCEEDINGS? 
Emily F. Ariz* 
ABSTRACT 
This note explores how the lack of binding precedent in both 
international commercial and investment arbitration affects 
transparency in arbitral proceedings. As arbitration increases in 
popularity, its deficiencies have become more apparent. The lack of 
binding precedent in arbitration is convenient in some ways, but 
problematic as it leaves arbitrators an immense amount of discretion 
when deciding cases. With many decisions unpublished to maintain 
confidentiality and those decisions that are published sometimes lack 
reasoning to support the award, transparency in arbitral proceedings 
is practically nonexistent.  In recent years, there is a trend toward more 
transparency in certain types of arbitral disputes. In this Note, I argue 
that while the lack of binding precedent in international arbitration 
encourages arbitrators to decide cases too freely, which contributes to 
the lack of transparency in arbitration, there are also many other 
factors that contribute to this problematic feature of international 
arbitration. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 357 
I. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF TRANSPARENCY...................................... 359 
II. CIVIL LAW SYSTEM VERSUS COMMON LAW SYSTEM ..................... 360 
A. HOW DO CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES MAINTAIN 
TRANSPARENCY WITHOUT BINDING PRECEDENT? ....... 362 
THESE ARE JUST A FEW WAYS THAT INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION CAN BECOME MORE TRANSPARENT AS IT 
ALREADY MIRRORS THE CIVIL SYSTEM MORE CLOSELY 
THAN IT DOES THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM. .................. 364 
B. IS THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM REALLY 
TRANSPARENT? .............................................................. 364 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2022, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2019, The George 
Washington University. 
2021 FACTORS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 357 
III. TYPES OF ARBITRATION ................................................................... 365 
A. WHAT IS ISDS? ............................................................... 365 
I. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES IN 
ISDS .................................................................. 366 
II. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW ................ 367 
III. EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW ............................................ 369 
IV. PUBLIC INTEREST POLICIES’ EFFECT ON ISDS . 369 
V. ISDS ATTACKS ON PUBLIC INTEREST 
POLICIES ............................................................ 370 
VI. THE FUTURE OF ISDS ....................................... 372 
B. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ............ 373 
IV. IS THIS LACK OF BINDING PRECEDENT NECESSARY OR 
PROBLEMATIC? ................................................................................. 374 
V. HOW DOES THIS LACK OF BINDING PRECEDENT AFFECT 
TRANSPARENCY? .............................................................................. 376 
VI. SHOULD THERE BE MORE TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION? .................................................................................. 377 
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 378 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration is a helpful tool for parties that want autonomy in 
resolving their disputes. Parties can agree on procedural rules, choice 
of law, location, and arbitrators among many other specifics when it 
comes to arbitration.1 While arbitral proceedings are desirable for their 
speedy and confidential nature, there is growing concern regarding 
transparency in international arbitration. 
The United States judicial system follows the legal doctrine of 
stare decisis, which means that “a court must follow earlier judicial 
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”2 Arbitral 
awards do not have this same binding quality, meaning that 
arbitrators do not have to follow prior arbitral awards when deciding 
 
1 See Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in 
Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 59 (2005). 
2 Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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cases and that the award is only binding on the parties in that case.3  In 
international commercial arbitration, arbitrators have controls in 
place, mostly by way of the New York Convention, but have a lot of 
freedom when issuing awards, as there is no clear practice for 
following past awards in this field.4 The confidential nature of arbitral 
awards means that many awards do not get published, leaving the 
public to wonder on what grounds the award was issued. This is 
especially significant because many commercial arbitration awards 
will have an effect on public policy. This lack of transparency 
contributes to the common characterization of international arbitration 
as being “lawless.”5 
In international commercial arbitration between private 
parties, transparency of arbitral proceedings may seem irrelevant as 
long as the dispute is resolved, but awards in international commercial 
arbitration can be impactful on international public policy.6 For 
example, governments will often take commonly arbitrated issues into 
consideration when drafting free trade agreements or bilateral 
investment treaties to protect domestic companies that have 
international ventures, thus shaping their international economic 
policies. Furthermore, arbitrators are selected by the parties to serve 
the parties and have little incentive to consider third parties, like the 
general public, in their decisions. 7 While there is a push in the 
international arbitration community to make certain types of arbitral 
proceedings, such as investor-state dispute settlement, more 
transparent by publishing all awards, the lack of binding precedent 
still limits transparency, as arbitrators are not obligated to give well-
supported legal reasoning in their awards.8 
 
3 See Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 
24 ARB. INT’L 357, 357, 361 (2007). 
4 Id. at 362. 
5 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. OF L.A. L. REV. 187, 
191 (2006). 
6 William P. Graham, International Commercial Arbitration and International Public 
Policy, in 81 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW) 372, 372 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987). 
7 See Drahozal, supra note 5 at 192. 
8 See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty § B, at 32 
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 Model U.S. BIT] (stating that documents relating to arbitral 
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I. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency has become a “buzzword” when discussing 
international investment and arbitration law.9 There is a general 
consensus that transparency is a good thing, necessary for social, 
economic, international, and domestic systems to function in a 
democratic way.10 In the context of international investment law and 
international arbitration, questions of who is owed transparency and 
in what respects become relevant. This largely depends on the type of 
arbitration at hand. For example, in investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS), transparency with respect to award amounts and the reasoning 
for the award should be publicly available to citizens of the country 
involved in the dispute and for other companies looking to invest in 
that host-state to learn from the mistakes of the investor.11 In 
international commercial arbitration, transparency means that the 
reasoning of awards should be available to provide predictability to 
parties that regularly conduct international transactions subject to 
arbitration.12 
Even with a push for creating more transparency in 
international arbitration, there is some information that should always 
be confidential, which the public has no right to know. For example, 
“trade secrets, confidential business information, state secrets, and 
information protected by professional or other legal privilege” should 
remain confidential as sensitive information.13 On the other hand, 
there is plenty of information in which the public should know, or at 
least have easily accessible, that is not. Some investment awards are 
not publicly published, which infringes on the public’s right to know 
how their government’s regulatory powers are affected.14 
Furthermore, the general public, investors, and states all have interest 
in knowing how arbitral tribunals interpret broadly applicable 
 
proceedings must be made public); see also Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps., 
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules pt. C, ch. 4, reg. 22 (2006). 
9 Andrea Bianchi, Transparency in International Law 142 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne 
Peters eds., Cambridge Uni. Press 2013). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 160. 
12 Id. at 161. 
13 Id. at 159. 
14 Id. at 160. 
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investment treaties.15 From access to justice and public accountability 
viewpoints, it is difficult to rationalize why arbitration proceedings in 
most contexts are kept confidential.16 There is also a category of 
information that is purposefully withheld for the advantage of the 
party with that knowledge.17 An example of this would be large 
international arbitration firms with extensive knowledge of individual 
arbitrators gleaned from years of practice.18 Having knowledge of 
which arbitrators are likely to persuade their co-arbitrators, which 
arbitrators keep the cases moving quickly, and so on can provide those 
large firms, and thus the parties they represent, a competitive 
advantage when choosing arbitrators to adjudicate a dispute.19 While 
some of this knowledge partially comes from experience, it also comes 
from having a wealth of unpublished arbitral awards.20 
The following sections will discuss the differences between 
civil law system and common law systems in these respects, 
specifically focusing on the role of precedent and prior case law in 
those systems. This is to show how arbitration functions more 
similarly to the civil law system in terms of binding precedent and how 
the lack of binding case law can affect the transparency of a court or 
tribunal’s decision. 
II. CIVIL LAW SYSTEM VERSUS COMMON LAW SYSTEM 
A brief discussion of the differences between the civil law 
system and the common law system will provide some historical 
context and reasoning behind the lack of binding precedent in 
international arbitration. The common law and civil law systems vary 
in what is the “basis” for the law. Understanding the differences 
between common law systems and civil law systems starts with an 
understanding of stare decisis and jurisprudence constante. 
Stare decisis is the rule, used in most common law systems, that 
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similarly situated cases. Jurisprudence constante, on the other hand, is 
“defined as a series of adjudicated cases that establishes a consistent 
and uniform application of a certain rule.”21 The key difference 
between the two is the function of case law: under stare decisis, judicial 
opinions are binding, whereas under jurisprudence constante, judicial 
opinions are merely persuasive.22 Many argue that jurisprudence 
constante informally exists in international arbitration, yet 
international arbitration is still very ad hoc by nature; just because 
arbitrators sometimes cite to precedent in their awards does not mean 
it is a common practice or has been widely accepted. Tribunals “still 
have complete discretion on how to interpret treaty provisions” and 
other applicable law and “disregard the decisions of other tribunals.”23 
Civil law is based on legislation, as opposed to common law, 
which is based on judicial decisions. Of course, common law countries 
also have legislation, but instead of being “formulated as general 
principles” as civil law legislation is, common law legislation 
“consist[s] rather of particular rules intended to control certain fact 
situations specified with considerable detail.”24 This forces common 
law systems to rely on judicial interpretation of legislation as a basis of 
law.25 Civil law systems rely on legislation that is intentionally drafted 
to be broadly applicable.26 This is not to say that civil law systems do 
not take previous cases into account, but the degree of persuasiveness 
is different depending on how many cases have been decided in a 
uniform way.27 Single decisions do not bind courts in civil law 
systems.28 As uniformity among cases increases overtime on a specific 
 
21 Dumitru Filip, The Role of Legitimate Expectations in Establishing a Jurisprudence 
Constante in International Investment Law, 5 MANCHESTER REV. L. CRIME & ETHICS 
28, 30 (2016). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 28. 
24 Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 
15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 425 (1967). 
25 Id. at 424. 
26 Id. 
27 Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A 
Dynamic Analysis, George Mason University School of Law, Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 04-15 1, 6 (2004). 
28 Id. 
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issue, the more persuasive the case law becomes.29 Furthermore, civil 
law systems give more deference to the legislative history of the laws, 
taking legislators’ discussions and comments into account when 
interpreting the law.30 
These differences lay the basis for differentiating between 
binding precedent and non-binding precedent. Arbitration very much 
follows the civil law tradition where “courts are not bound to follow 
previous judicial decisions.”31 Like civil law courts, arbitrators 
adjudicate cases based on the general principles of the applicable law, 
rather than looking at how prior, similar disputes were decided like 
the common law system would provide for.32 The question then 
becomes: is it fair and equitable, as arbitration usually places emphasis 
on, for common law to be adjudicated in a forum where decisions are 
made in the way of a civil law system? Using an example to state it 
more clearly: should laws of the United States, which may be the 
applicable law of arbitration, be decided on its “general principles” in 
arbitration, when the laws were not designed to be adjudicated in that 
way? This is just another issue that affects the transparency of 
arbitration. 
A few questions that arise when contemplating how the 
common law and civil law systems compare and fit into arbitration 
include how civil law systems maintain transparency and consistency 
without binding precedent and whether the common law system is 
really “transparent.” The following sections will discuss these 
questions in depth. 
a. How Do Civil Law Countries Maintain Transparency 
without Binding Precedent? 
Countries with civil law systems maintain a degree of 
transparency in their judicial proceedings without following 
precedent in several ways, some of which are attainable for arbitral 
tribunals. Some ways that civil law systems preserve transparency are 
through the judicial appointment process, judicial financial 
 
29 Id. 
30 Dainow, supra note 20, at 424. 
31 Id. at 426. 
32 Id. 
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disclosures, and public access to judicial decisions.33 The judicial 
selection and appointment process varies widely across different legal 
systems, but despite the exact mechanics of this process, the standards 
for judges are typically consistent.34 Some factors and principles 
considered include objective, merit-based appointments, looking at 
professional standing, the experience level, and necessary legal skills 
of the individual candidates.35 Having an open process can discourage 
the influence of external forces or other branches of government.36 
Similar standards should be utilized by arbitrators.37 The ability of 
arbitrators is rarely called into question, but when it is, the entire 
award may be thrown out, forcing the parties to start from scratch. 
Thoroughly vetting arbitrators is a crucial step in arbitration that 
allows the parties to secure a level of stability and transparency in the 
proceedings. 
Judicial financial disclosures refers to the requiring public 
officials, like judges, filing an asset and income disclosure statement.38 
This creates a sense of trust in public administration by being open 
about any potential conflicts of interest or any bribery.39 Applying this 
principle to arbitration would be more difficult, as there is already a 
duty to disclose conflicts of interest imposed upon arbitrators. Because 
the public accountability factor is minimized with arbitrators, this 
requirement is not as essential, but requiring arbitrators to continue to 
disclose any conflicts of interest clearly still is.40 
Publishing judicial decisions is “a vital element in preventing 
perceptions of secrecy and lack of accountability, which can in turn 
generate distrust and confusion amongst the public.”41As discussed at 
length, availability and accessibility of judicial decisions allows 
 
33 Clifton Johnson, The Development of the Court Administration: Directions and 
Model, INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE (Jun. 14, 2018), https://www.idlo.
int/news/speeches-and-advocacy/enhancing-judicial-transparency-and-promoting-pu
blic-trust. 






40 See id. 
41 Id. 
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judiciaries to provide clarity and consistency within their legal 
system.42 Applying the same principle to arbitration is simple. 
Publishing awards will foster consistency, even if stare decisis is not the 
presiding rule. 
These are just a few ways that international arbitration can 
become more transparent as it already mirrors the civil 
system more closely than it does the common law system. 
b. Is the Common Law System Really Transparent? 
While the common law approach uses stare decisis to provides 
stability and predictability, the transparency of decisions may be 
questioned.43 Judicial decisions continuously building upon each other 
and being able to find case law on almost any issue provides a certain 
foundation and stability that enables the common law systems to 
function.44 Yet, the common law system may not be as transparent as 
it boasts. 
Another issue with some common law jurisdictions, 
specifically the United States, is that not all judges are selected and 
appointed through a transparent process. While some judges in the 
United States are voted in, federal judges and Supreme Court judges 
are appointed by the president. This clearly give another branch of the 
government, the executive branch,  power and influence over the 
judiciary. 
Judges in common law systems simply follow whatever prior 
case law says, unless there is good reason, like outdated cases, to 
overrule the previously established law. There is the argument that 
judges do not thoroughly think through their decisions under this 
model as they feel an obligation to stick with precedent.45 Furthermore, 
when the case law is already established, there is less of a need to 
reason and explain why a case comes out a certain way.46 While this 
 
42 Id. 
43 See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
44 See id. 
45 See generally id. 
46 See generally id. 
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may offer stability and predictability in the legal system, it makes it 
very difficult to change any settled case law. This inflexibility of the 
system can allow for injustice for years until a case makes it to a higher 
court to be overturned. 
The following sections will discuss two types of arbitration 
and how the lack of binding precedent has negatively affected the 
transparency of arbitral outcomes. Specifically, this section focuses on 
the role of the fair and equitable treatment standard, a legal standard 
commonly used in investment arbitration, in arbitrator’s decisions and 
that has not been fully developed as a result of a lack of binding 
precedent. As demonstrated below, this underdevelopment has led to 
awards that have not been thoroughly reasoned and lack 
transparency. 
III. TYPES OF ARBITRATION 
There are several different types of arbitration, and usually the 
level of transparency is determined by the type of arbitration. For 
example, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is typical more 
transparent than commercial arbitration because almost every opinion 
is published. But even if the opinion is published, does not mean that 
the arbitrator necessarily explain the reasoning behind their decisions. 
This following section will focus on the ISDS system and how the 
inconsistency of interpretation of law and the freedom given to 
arbitrators in deciding their awards can have disproportionate and 
unrationalized consequences that negatively affect states and their 
citizens. 
a. What is ISDS? 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is a critical part of 
foreign investment. The ISDS system promotes foreign investment by 
providing investors with the confidence that their investments will be 
protected, and any associated disputes will be fairly resolved. Without 
an agreement on how to settle disputes between a host state and 
foreign private investor, the dispute would normally be handled by a 
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domestic court of the host country.47 Foreign investors find this 
disadvantageous as those courts are typically bound by domestic law, 
which may not protect the investor’s rights under international law.48 
Additionally, investors often believe that the host state’s courts will 
not be impartial when settling the dispute. Submitting to arbitration is 
also beneficial for the host state as it can “protect itself against other 
forums for foreign or international litigation.”49 Arbitration is typically 
more efficient that traditional litigation, benefitting both the host state 
and investor who seek a speedy resolution. Finally, “[e]quating the 
private investment interests with those of the entire nation could 
ultimately lead to tensions that threaten the peace in the modern 
world.”50 One of the most important benefits of ISDS is that it 
depoliticizes the dispute and “reduces unnecessary diplomatic friction 
in the area of investment . . . by broadening the legal context into a 
wider arena of global economic interest, not merely the particular two 
national entities involved in a given case.”51 
i. The Role of International Treaties in ISDS 
International treaties are how countries agree to ISDS. These 
include free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) which include provisions that enable an aggrieved investor with 
an investment in territory of a foreign host government to bring a claim 
against that government for breach of an investment agreement before 
an international arbitration panel. 
A free trade agreement is “an agreement between two or more 
countries where the countries agree on certain obligations that affect 
trade in goods and services, and protections for investors and 
intellectual property rights.”52 The goal of FTAs is to reduce or 
 
47 Won-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Paradigm, 10 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 725, 734 (2007). 
48 Id. at 735. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 736. 
51 Id. 
52 International Trade Administration (Department of Commerce), Free Trade 
Agreement Overview, https://www.trade.gov/free-trade-agreement-overview. 
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eliminate trade barriers, which in turn encourages international 
trade.53 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are agreements that lay out 
the terms for private investment in foreign countries. Typically, BITs 
are drafted to protect private investors rather than the host countries, 
in an effort to encourage more private investment in foreign 
countries.54 Under most United States BITs, and FTAs, protected 
property includes moveable and immoveable property, tangible and 
intangible assets, and intellectual property. The purpose of these 
investment agreements is to protect investments from expropriation, 
political risk such as a change in government, or revocation of permits, 
among other risks that come with foreign investment. 
ii. Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment 
Law 
The fair and equitable treatment standard (FET) is the basis for 
many ISDS claims. The standard has its origins in the 1948 Havana 
Charter for an International Trade Organization.55 The standard is meant 
to protect investors from instances of “arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
abusive content by host states.”56 However, the standard is often 
critiqued for being too vague and does not provide enough guidance 
to arbitrators, thus giving arbitrators too much discretion in their 
decision making.57 This uncertainty in application and interpretation 
of the standard leads to concern when the FET standard is used in the 
context of ISDS because it can “restrict host-country administrative 
 
53 Id. 
54 Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties. 
55 Directorate for Financial And Enterprise Affairs, Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard in International Investment Law,  ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 3 (2004), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment
-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf. 
56 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 
UNITED NATIONS 1, 1 (2012), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/uncta
ddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf. 
57 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, supra note 51 at 2-3. 
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and governmental action to a degree that threatens the policymaking 
autonomy of that country.”58 
The general rule for the FET standard that has developed over 
the years is that the host-state must provide stability and predictability 
consistent with customary international law. There are clear instances 
where State conduct would constitute a violation of the standard 
including: (1) defeating investors’ legitimate expectations (in balance 
with the host State’s right to regulate in public interest); (2) denial of 
justice and due process; (3) manifest arbitrariness in decision-making; 
(4) discrimination; and (5) outright abusive treatment.59 
These key elements of the FET standard have been identified 
and developed by arbitral tribunals. The first is the protections of 
investors’ legitimate expectations, which is closely tied to changes that 
effect the investment.60 As foreign investment typically involves 
projects with long durations, changes to the business environment, 
how the host-state is involved in those changes, and what the host-
state will do to safeguard the investment in the event of a change is 
crucial to investor’s expectations.61 The second element is denial of 
justice and due process. While it is nearly impossible to define all 
instances that would constitute denial of justice and due process, the 
tribunal will likely consider the following in its determination: (1) 
denial of access to justice and the refusal of courts to decide; (2) 
unreasonable delay in proceedings; (3) lack of a court’s independence 
from the legislative and the executive branches of the State; (4) failure 
to execute final judgments or arbitral awards; (5) corruption of a judge; 
(6) discrimination against the foreign litigant; (7) breach of 
fundamental due process guarantees.62 The next element is  manifest 
arbitrariness, which focuses on the motivations and objective behind 
the conduct at issue in arbitration.63 The fourth element is 
discrimination, which is straightforward as it “prohibits 
discrimination against foreign investors and their investments.”64 The 
 
58 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 52 at 1. 
59 Id. at 62. 
60 Id. at 63. 
61 See Id. 
62 Id. at 80. 
63 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra n. 2 at 78. 
64 Id. at 81-82 (footnote omitted). 
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final elements is abusive treatment, which includes conduct 
constituting “coercion, duress and harassment that involve 
unwarranted and improper pressure, abuse of power, persecution, 
threats, intimidation and use of force.”65 Because the FET standard is 
essentially a catch-all for any host-states’ conduct that would 
jeopardize stability and predictability, it is one of the most common 
allegations to trigger ISDS proceedings. 
iii. Expropriation in International Investment Law 
Expropriation is the taking of aliens’ property without 
adequate compensation, regardless of whether the property was taken 
for a public purpose or not.66 While direct expropriation through 
nationalization was common in the 1970s and 1980s, now investors are 
threatened by indirect expropriation.67 Indirect expropriation most 
commonly occurs when host-states’ domestic policies interfere with 
foreign investment, which includes regulatory schemes aimed at 
protecting the environment, public health, or other public welfare 
interests.68 With the nature of ISDS that allows for investors to bring 
such expropriation claims under the FET standard, this in concerning 
as increasingly, investors’ rights are put before public interest. 
iv. Public Interest Policies’ Effect on ISDS 
As previously mentioned, FTAs and BITs are increasingly 
being interpreted to prioritize investors’ rights in protecting their 
investments in foreign states. Although ISDS is a useful tool for solving 
disputes that arise between states and investors, the system 
“fundamentally shifts the balance of power among investors, States, 
and the general public” while diminishing the “rights of governments 
to regulate.”69 This balance of power is shifted because ISDS elevates 
 
65 Id. at 82. 
66 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Indirect 
Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law, OECD 
WORKING PAPERS ON INT’L INV. 1, 3 (2004). 
67 Id. at 2. 
68 Id. 
69 Public Citizen, Case Studies: Investor-State Attacks on Public Interest Policies, 1, 
1 (2015). 
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investors to the same status as sovereign governments and allows 
them to “privately enforce a public treaty.”70 It may be assumed that 
states involved in ISDS proceedings represent the interests of its 
citizens, but the interests of the general public and states’ governments 
are not always aligned, leaving individuals that would be greatly 
affected by ISDS awards without representation in the dispute. The 
following section will detail several ISDS cases from recent years to 
demonstrate that investors typically win these cases due to the vague 
and low threshold of the FET standard. 
v. ISDS Attacks on Public Interest Policies 
The first case is Metalclad v. Mexico. This case related to toxic 
waste and ended in an investor win where the investor was awarded 
$16.2 million.71 These proceedings occurred while NAFTA was still 
effective, which included a FET clause.72 Here, the Metalclad was 
denied permits for expansion of its toxic waste facility by a Mexican 
municipality government which cited concerns of water 
contamination and environmental and health hazards as the reasons 
for denial.73 Denial of these permits was deemed expropriation under 
the FET standard, even though the municipal government denied the 
same permits to the Mexican company from which Metalclad acquired 
the facility.74 Mexico had to pay Metalclad for the diminution in value 
of its investment without proper compensation.75 
The next case deals with an oil concession contract in Occidental 
Petroleum v. Ecuador. This case is particularly shocking as the arbitral 
tribunal imposed a standard that was not included in the BIT 
regarding the FET standard.76 Here, Occidental “illegally sold 40 
percent of its production rights of its another firm without government 
approval,” which not only violated the contract between the parties, 
but also violated Ecuador’s hydrocarbon laws.77 The tribunal 
 
70 Id. 





76 Id. at 5–6. 
77 Id. at 5. 
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acknowledges that Occidental broke the law, but stated that the 
Ecuadorian government did not respond proportionally to the breach 
of contract by terminating the agreement.78 This disproportionate 
reaction was deemed a violation of the FET standard and the tribunal 
awarded Occidental with $2.3 billion.79 This amount was later reduced 
to $1.4 billion, “reducing the damages that had been based on the 40 
percent share that had been sold,” which still left a sizable hole 
Ecuador’s pockets.80 
Abengoa v. Mexico is another toxic waste case, but actually 
involves the public demanding protection from environmental 
harms.81 This dispute fell under the Spain-Mexico BIT and the claim 
was filed by the Company alleging that it could not operate its waste 
management facility in Mexico because the local community strongly 
opposed it.82 The waste management facility would put the already 
contaminated area at further risk for environmental harm.83 The local 
government revoked Abengoa’s land use permit as a result of the 
public opposition, but the matter continued to escalate.84 Finally, the 
city council fully shut down the site and explained that it “did not 
comply with public policy.”85 The arbitral tribunal found that the 
revocation of the license amounted to indirect expropriation and 
therefore “ordered Mexico to pay Abengoa more than $40 million, plus 
interest, as compensation for its expected future profits from the waste 
plant and to cover half of the corporation’s own tribunal and legal 
costs.”86 
The final case discussed is Azurix v. Argentina, which falls 
under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.87 Azurix made a 30-year deal with 
Argentina to provide water and sewage treatment to 2.5 million 
people.88 Within months, the local governments advised citizens not to 
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drink or pay for the water services, which led to civil unrest.89 The 
government and Azurix tried to blame each other for the algae 
contamination causing the unclean water, yet more problems arose.90 
Azurix over-billed citizens and was responsible for several water 
outages. After withdrawing from the deal, Azurix filed a claim stating 
that it did not receive fair and equitable treatment because the 
government did not allow it to raise rates and did not invest enough 
money into the water infrastructure.91 The tribunal considered 
“whether legitimate public interest policies could constitute BIT 
violations,” but ultimately found that Argentina’s conduct violated the 
FET standard.92 Azurix walked away with $165 million, plus interest, 
and covered most of the tribunal’s costs.93 
These cases are just a microcosm of the ISDS cases in which 
investors are awarded millions, or even billions, of dollars due to the 
vagueness and seemingly low threshold of what fair and equitable 
means under the FET standard. If the FET standard was more 
thoroughly developed, the application of the standard would be more 
uniform and predictable. This would occur if arbitrators had to follow 
previous interpretations of the standard and build upon those the 
interpretations to create a clearer guideline for how the standard 
applies to each case. Taxpayers in mostly poor countries end up paying 
the cost of these awards, even when the public clearly opposes some 
of the “investments.” While investors’ rights are important, equally 
important is the incentive to implement policies in favor of public 
interest, especially with respect to public international and domestic 
policy. 
vi. The Future of ISDS 
ISDS has become an integral part of international investment 
law, however there may be more limits on ISDS in future agreements. 
Moving toward a dispute resolution system that allows host-states to 
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take time, as many of the agreements that prop up ISDS will likely not 
be revised or replaced anytime soon. But small shifts toward 
eliminating ISDS are already happening in the international 
investment world. For example, NAFTA’s replacement agreement, 
USMCA, between the United States, Mexico, and Canada that 
establishes a free trade area that limits the use of ISDS.94 No American 
investors can initiate ISDS proceedings against Canada and the 
availability of ISDS between the United States and Mexico is limited to 
certain sectors.95 As a new agreement among powerful states in the 
western hemisphere, USMCA may set precedent in moving away from 
ISDS and finding or creating a dispute resolution system that takes 
public interest into account during decision making. 
b. International Commercial Arbitration 
Another common type of arbitration is international 
commercial arbitration. International commercial arbitration has been 
a preferred method of dispute resolution in the “cross-border context” 
for many decades, as it offers a way for parties to customize the way 
in which disputes are resolved—as was previously discussed towards 
the beginning of this paper—by having choice of law provisions, 
choice of procedure and rules governing arbitration provisions, and 
being able to choose the arbitrators and location of arbitration.96 
Finally, the most attractive draw for large companies is the privacy of 
arbitration. 
As discussed earlier, most international commercial arbitral 
awards are kept confidential, so those awards cannot be analyzed in 
the same way that ISDS awards are. Additionally, the confidentiality 
of international commercial arbitral awards means that those awards 
have less of an impact on public policy. Nonetheless, international 
commercial arbitration is relevant to the topic of lack of precedent, as 
these arbitral awards are not always based in precedent. Again, this 
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lack of set precedent in international commercial arbitration 
contributes to decreased transparency in the system. The following 
section will discuss how the lack of binding precedent may be 
necessary in the context of international commercial arbitration. 
IV. IS THIS LACK OF BINDING PRECEDENT NECESSARY OR 
PROBLEMATIC? 
This is undoubtedly a loaded question, dependent on many 
factors. It is well-known that arbitrators often do not apply the law. 
Many arbitral decisions are “based on principles of equity and fairness, 
rather than legal obligation.”97 An arbitrator’s authority comes from a 
contract between the parties, so assuming the contract is valid, the 
parties assent to comply with the arbitrator’s decision whether or not 
the arbitrator applies the law.98 Thus because the arbitrator works 
directly for the parties, there is more incentive to reach a decision that 
may be preferred by the parties rather than one that strictly follows the 
law.99 Some argue that in an effort to have an award “be enforceable 
in all jurisdictions where review is likely,” arbitrators try to conform 
with the rule of law as a vacated award would put the parties back 
where there started with the dispute.100 However, arbitral decisions 
are typically reviewed on procedural, not substantive, grounds 
making the arbitrator’s incentive to avoid a vacated award weak.101 
It may seem backward that arbitrators do not always apply 
law, but this is exactly why the parties agreed to arbitrate in the first 
place. In international arbitration, the law applicable to case may be 
uncertain if it is not agreed upon in advance through a contract. 
Furthermore, designating a party’s domestic law as the applicable law 
in arbitral proceedings beforehand may disadvantage the other party 
because the parties come from different countries with different legal 
systems.102 The arbitrator is there to settle the dispute as quickly and 
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amicably as possible, so getting caught up in the specifics of applicable 
law or conflicts of law issues goes against the goals of arbitration. 
The lack of binding precedent in international arbitration not 
only affects transparency but also negatively impacts the development 
of law. When parties decide to arbitrate, “they remove the case from 
the public court system,” which means that no court will decide the 
issue, there will most likely not be a published opinion, and it will not 
serve as binding precedent for similarly situated litigants in the 
future.103 In addition to being unpublished, arbitral awards may not 
provide reasoning as to how the arbitrator reached the decision, 
further justifying why arbitral awards cannot be a substitute for 
binding precedent.104 Finally, the lack of binding precedent means that 
there are likely conflicting awards which causes inconsistency and 
confusion.105 Attorneys preparing for arbitration may find it difficult 
to formulate arguments based on past cases because there may be 
several similar cases with different outcomes. This allows parties to 
walk blindly into arbitration without any certainty in the strength of 
their arguments. As international arbitration does not allow the public 
judicial system to adjudicate novel legal issues, this impedes national 
judicial systems from further developing their own jurisprudence. 
A less critical view is one that finds this lack of binding 
precedent necessary. Because each issue adjudicated in international 
arbitration is so different, binding precedent could lead to injustice in 
cases that turn on fact-specific inquiries.106 In international commercial 
arbitration specifically, disputes are so fact- and contract-driven that 
the need for developing consistent rules is nonexistent.107 In contrast, 
international sports arbitration requires “the development of 
consistent rules through arbitral awards” because there is an incentive 
for equal treatment of every player as the sports arbitration normally 
deals with recurrent issues.108 Additionally, international sports 
arbitration has governing bodies, the international federations, that 
can substantively review arbitral awards, creating a meaningful check 
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on the arbitrator’s power.109 With independent tribunals dealing with 
various types of arbitral matters and no designated supervisory 
institution, it seems the lack of binding precedent is a necessity, as 
instituting a system for binding precedent would shake the core of the 
system.110 
V. HOW DOES THIS LACK OF BINDING PRECEDENT AFFECT 
TRANSPARENCY? 
As previously mentioned, arbitrators do not have to provide 
any reasoning for their decisions. A perfect example is Occidental 
Petroleum v. Ecuador. The arbitral tribunal imposed a standard that was 
not included in the bilateral investment treaty, without reason.111 The 
tribunal’s ability to seemingly concoct rules and arguments from thin 
air makes arbitration unpredictable. If there were binding precedent, 
or at the very least recognized jurisprudence constante, the arbitrators 
would at least have to distinguish or analogize the case in front of them 
with precedent to explain why they are or are not following precedent. 
This is an example of how even with published decisions, arbitral 
proceedings cannot achieve complete transparency because the 
reasoning of a published award may not have any grounding in law. 
Published decisions are just one step to increasing transparency. 
Without providing reasoning, interested parties such as states, 
investors, and the general public have no guidance on how a tribunal 
came to its decision on the award. 
Furthermore, there are limited to no checks on the arbitrators’ 
power in arbitral proceedings. The arbitrators’ award is law. While the 
arbitral tribunal must follow the procedural rules chosen by the 
parties, almost every other part of conducting the proceedings may be 
at the discretion of the tribunal. Arbitration awards are typically only 
reviewed on procedural, not substantive grounds.112 For example, 
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most arbitral awards are only subject to review in the event that an 
arbitrator is deemed unable to make an unbiased decision. If there 
were binding precedent, arbitrators would have to follow previous 
law in their decisions, which arguably makes the decision more 
objective. This again goes back to imposing a duty upon arbitral 
tribunals to provide reasoning for their awards to increase 
transparency. 
VI. SHOULD THERE BE MORE TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION? 
Privacy of proceedings is one reason why international 
arbitration is so popular, especially with large corporations and 
governments through ISDS. Arbitral awards are not typically 
published, and the parties typically sign a non-disclosure agreement, 
so the awards are not made public. 
The process of seeking enforcement of awards in a country’s 
judicial system does not necessarily aid in increasing  transparency, 
because arbitral awards are usually only evaluated on a procedural, 
not substantive basis.113 So even if a party seeks enforcement, the 
state’s court will likely not review the award because it will only have 
the resources and jurisdiction to enforce it. One way to encourage 
transparency may be through the creation of an appeals process, 
allowing other arbitrators to review decisions on a substantive basis. 
Finally, one way to encourage transparency without 
completely compromising confidentiality may be to allow more third-
party intervention in proceedings. If a third-party can prove the 
decision would directly affect it, the third party would be allowed to 
participate in the proceedings.114 The allowance of amicus curiae 
briefs, briefs submitted by non-parties to other more information or 
expertise on a specific issue, are increasingly popular and important in 
international arbitration proceedings as the push for transparency 
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becomes more urgent.115 While amici curiae remain crucial, the actual 
intervention of interested parties would be more influential. Of course, 
there would have to be an established standard as to who is considered 
an interested party, but this may be a powerful tool for interested non-
parties to meaningfully participate in arbitral proceedings. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As the international arbitration community continues to 
recognize the increasing need for transparency in arbitration 
proceedings, there are several options to consider in the potential 
reform of international arbitration.116 While establishing binding 
precedent may contribute to transparency more quickly there are 
several other innovative ways to encourage transparency in 
international arbitration including publishing awards, having 
established jurisprudence constante, allowing for third-party 
interventions, and creating an appeals process. As long-standing 
investment treaties are being re-thought, re-worked, and re-negotiated 
by world leaders, the principle of transparency and the many ways to 




115 See Katia Fach Gomez, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International 
Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest, 35 
FORDHAM INT’L L. REV. 509, 523–24 (2012). 
116 United Parcel Serv. v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for 
Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, ¶70 (NAFTA Arb. 2001) (stating 
“[t]he emphasis placed on the value of greater transparency for proceedings such as 
these [investor-state disputes]. Such proceedings are not now, if they ever were, to be 
equated to the standard run of international commercial arbitration between private 
parties”). 
